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Darya Kraynaya
Honors Thesis
December 22, 2006
Burundian Refugees and Perpetuation of
Instability in the Great Lakes Region
For over a decade Burundi has faced internal conflict between the Tutsi and the
Hutu. The Republic of Burundi received its independence on July 1, 1962 and three years
later, the Prime Minister was assassinated. The assassination of Pierre Ngendandumwe,
the Hutu Prime Minister, led to an outbreak of a chain of revolts by the Hutu. The
conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Burundi became more serious after the tragic
events of Rwanda in 1994. (Situation Report: Burundi) The future of Burundi depends on
the progress of possible reconciliation between the warring Hutu and Tutsi and of course
the outlawed militant groups. The progress of reconciliation is essential because,
although a ceasefire agreement was reached in May 2005, between the extremist Hutu
group, Palipehutu-FNL ("FNL”) and the government of Burundi, the fighting still
continues. It is of utmost importance to analyze this long conflict because not only has it
resulted in great numbers of refugees seeking asylum outside of their home country, and
internally displaced persons (IDPs), but also it has greatly impeded the development of
Burundi as an independent state and has had negative effects on the neighboring states.
Tanzania has been particularly affected because it has been hosting large numbers of
Burundian refugees for several years. In 1996, approximately 100,000 were “relocated by
force into special camps.” (Cohen and Deng, 15). Although the exact number of
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Burundian refugees is unknown, according to United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR),
There are now more than 4,000 Burundian asylum seekers
in three way stations in the district of Kibondo, in northwestern Tanzania. Some 3,500 Burundians have crossed
the border since the start of the year and the numbers keep
growing at an average rate of 100 new arrivals a day
(Growing Number of Burundians Flee to Neighbouring
Tanzania).
The conflict in Burundi has perpetuated and prolonged the instability of the Great Lakes
Region and even today, the number of Burundian refugees coming to Tanzania continues
growing.
The refugee situation in the Great Lakes region is

undeniably a crisis.

Undoubtedly, when thousands of innocent people, civilians are dying at the hand of those
whom they have been living side by side with for many years, it is a crisis. Additionally,
the number of refugees is increasing and borders between Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania
are practically open, which in turn creates a serious security issue. This crisis not only
affects Burundi, but every state in the Great Lakes region. Furthermore, the conflict in
Burundi and the refugee crisis is humanitarian, diplomatical/political, and of course has
affected national and international security.
The parallel between the events in Burundi and Rwanda is clear, and the problem
seems even identical. Adrien Ntabona, secretary general of the Conference of Catholic
Bishops in Burundi stresses that the tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi were shaped
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by the Belgian colonization. The colonizers favored one of the ethnic groups, Tutsi,
which in turn provided to the ethnic group more resources, such as education,
employment and power of rule. The Tutsi originally were the “favorites” because they
had lighter skin and appeared more European, which certainly pleased the Belgian
colonizers. However, it is important to note that in the 1930’s when ethnic identity cards
were introduced, Burundian citizens were not sure how to identify themselves due to
numerous cases of intermarriage between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Therefore, the Belgians
decided that “those men with ten or more cattle were declared Tutsi and those with less
than ten were declared Hutu” (Janzen and Janzen, 176). While this fact may appear
insignificant, it is in fact, crucial because it shows that it was, in fact colonization,
particularly the Belgian colonization of Burundi, that broke the “balance of clanship and
occupational groups [because the Belgian] government sought to rule through the
established elite” (Janzen and Janzen, 176).
Following Pierre Ngendandumwe’s assassination in 1965, the Tutsi controlled
government has actively suppressed the Hutu opposition. Needless to say, the means of
solving the “problem”--the perpetual conflict between the Tutsis and Hutu, were very
violent while at the same time strategic. As stated in Burundi: Genocide and Transition:
Tutsis discrimination against Hutu was most keenly felt in
two ways: denial of educational opportunities, which meant
that most government positions (which required education
and other skills) were filled by Tutsis; and, by means of a
strange ‘girth by height’ requirement, blockage of Hutu
entry into the armed forces. (1-2)
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Because the Tutsis controlled the armed forces, they were able to utilize the means
available to them to “perform acts of genocide on the Hutus” (Burundi: Genocide and
Transition). Primarily they justify the use of the security forces as prevention against
protests. However, it is clear that they utilized security forces to ensure the suppression of
the Hutu voice in society, economy, and politics.
Another outbreak of violence, in 1972, according to Warren Weinstein and Robert
Schrire “resulted from a discrepancy between the reality of inequality and ethnic
privilege.” (21) Although government leaders denied that the Tutsi received preferential
treatment, in fact the Tutsi enjoyed “economic and political benefits.” (22) Burundi had a
growing population, but not enough soil to be distributed equally between all citizens,
thus competition for land possession intensified and created more tension between the
Hutu and the Tutsi.
In 1990, the conflict between the Hutu and the security forces controlled by the
Tutsis resulted in 3,000 deaths. The conflict has escalated throughout the years, every
year bringing more casualties, civilian as well as those of the security forces and the
military. One of the particularly hot points in the history of the conflict arrived in
November 1998. At that point, large numbers of refugees have been sent to “regroupment
sites” where they were treated inhumanely by the security guards, and had no access to
basic resources such as clean water and humanitarian aid. It is quite disturbing that while
the international community, UNHCR and the Human Rights Watch were condemning
the treatment of Burundi refugees by the host countries, the same was happening on the
Burundi territory where conflict had been brewing for several years.
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Due to the conflict, the relationship of Tutsi and the Hutu in Burundi is rapidly
becoming worse; the hope of reconciliation seems to be dimming. Neighboring states,
such as Tanzania are deeply affected by the conflict and although the Tanzanian
government committed itself to providing the Burundian refugees with homes and
protecting them, rather than being encouraged in their efforts, the Tanzanian government
finds itself surrounded by widespread criticism. The issue of Burundi is not only a
humanitarian issue for the people who are directly affected by it; although indirectly, it
negatively affects neighboring states like Tanzania. Tanzania is dealing with a full-blown
refugee crisis, and no one is willing to acknowledge that the problem lies within Burundi.
Tanzanian government is the one being held responsible for human rights abuses by the
Human Rights Watch. However, Human Rights Watch representatives entirely overlook
the fact that Tanzania’s government and the citizens are equally overwhelmed by the
responsibility that has been bestowed on them. The conflict in Burundi is a matter of
international security because the refugees coming from Burundi are not necessarily
persons seeking asylum from persecution. They can just as well be the persecutors,
making sure that the people they want to eliminate do not find safety in the borders of a
neighboring country. Furthermore, Burundian refugees increase the instability within
Tanzania’s borders because when there is a problem within refugee camps, they protest
and react aggressively. Thus, states like Tanzania and its citizens are put at risk.
According to the UN, Burundi is an unstable state, which means that the
environment within the borders is not one where the refugees can be repatriated to,
because all factors are volatile—the economy, the government and the living conditions.
Attempts to resolve the conflict and move toward a more peaceful coexistence seem to
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only add to the already existing instability and danger to the neighboring states of the
African region. While the issue of refugees is pressing, there is also the issue of militant
groups that cross borders of these neighboring states thus allowing the conflict to
transcend borders. It seems that while the world promised not to allow another Rwandan
genocide to happen, precisely that is happening. International community and the United
Nations failed to respond to events in Rwanda in 1994 and they are failing the African
people again. The question lingers, who is to be held responsible? Both sides of the
conflict have been violent towards each other and the death tolls continue rising. Neither
the Tutsi nor the Hutu are willing to take on a clear responsibility for what has been
going on. While the Hutu have continuously instigated violent uprisings against the Tutsi
government, the security forces have repeatedly retaliated with violence. The conflict has
gone on for so long and so many have been and are now involved that it is no longer
possible to go back in history to the very beginning of Burundi as a sovereign state and
identify the “instigator” without identifying the “wrong people”.
In September 2004, during the General Assembly 6th plenary meeting in New
York, President Domitien Ndayizeye addressed the plenary and the UN by thanking them
for their efforts in Burundi. He also proudly claimed that:
The signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement for Burundi on 28 August 2000…ushered in a
new era of calm and a gradual return to peace with the
conclusion of ceasefire agreements with the armed political
movements, especially since the signing on 16 November
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2003 of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement with the main
rebel movement. (A/59/PV.6)
President Ndayizeye was clearly optimistic about the situation in his country at the time
of the meeting. He felt that that Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was just
what the country needed to alleviate itself of the problems and obstacles that the conflict
between the security forces and the opposition forces was creating. He promised that a
plan was now in place to:
protect and strengthen peace and security by integrating the
fighters from the armed movements into the security and
defense forces that we will need to establish our national
army and police force, to the comfort of all. The process will
be complemented by the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants and troops not included in the
integration process. (A/59/PV.6)
Furthermore, the President called on the international community, particularly the
African states and the African Union, to unite and work together to prevent the spreading
of armed conflict like the one that has been plaguing Burundi and other neighboring
African states.
Despite the hopeful outlook that President Ndayizeye had in 2004, at the present
time, Burundi still finds itself with the problem of internally displaced persons and
refugees who temporarily reside in neighboring African states. Even though in the recent
past, Tanzania has helped large numbers of Burundian refugees return home. According
to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, last year in January,
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renewed fighting caused thousands of civilians to find themselves without a home in
Bujumbura Rural. The governor of the province, Ignace Ntawembarira reported that in
Kanyosha, IDPs "[were] sleeping in schools, court buildings or in people's homes [after
the fighting broke out]." The only aid received immediately following the incident was
from the International Rescue Committee, and all they brought was water. Ntawembarira
also said that “6,000 IDPs were known to be in the Bujumbura neighborhoods of Ruyaga
in Kanyosha and that another 5,000 were in Vugizo, a town on the outskirts east of
Bujumbura.” (BURUNDI: Year in Brief)
Following the above presented evidence, the Republic of Burundi, to this day,
finds itself struggling with armed conflict within its borders. In order to analyze the issue
in depth not only does the history of the conflict needs to be investigated, but also the
following must be addressed: the reaction of the international community, the reaction of
the United Nations, the reaction of the Human Rights organization and the amount of aid
that Burundi has received. In 2004, President Ndayizeye was filled with hope after the
signing of the Arusha Agreements claiming that this document will help restore the peace
in Burundi and that the state was on its way to peaceful development. However, nearly
two years after his enthusiastic speech in the General Assembly, reports of fighting,
displaced persons, growing numbers of refugees and continued hostility keep showing
up.
While the governments of the world silently watch the events in Burundi unravel,
human rights organizations are voicing their opinion loud and clear. Alison des Forges,
senior Africa adviser at Human Rights Watch, stated, “In their drive to defeat the FNL,
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government soldiers, police and intelligence agents use tactics that violate both
Burundian and international law” (Human Rights Watch). Human Rights Watch reports:
In the Burundian capital Bujumbura, the recent killing of a
16-year-old who was seen in the hands of intelligence
agents and police shortly before he was shot to death.
Official accounts that he was shot while trying to escape do
not concur with evidence that he was shot in the face and
chest (Burundi: Donors Must Press for End to Continuing
Abuses).
In a report titled Warning Signs: Continuing Abuses in Burundi, released February 27,
2006, the Human Rights Watch examines the recent developments in Burundi. The report
addresses and presents a list of continuous human rights abuses: killings by the FNL,
executions by government forces, torture by the Documentation Nationale and the police,
random arrests and collective punishment. The Human Rights Watch report advises that
donor nations “need to go beyond merely pledging funds if they hope to see real
improvements in the country” (2).
In the recent past, the international community focused on the Great Lakes
Region. Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan declared:
In countries emerging from conflict like Burundi,
reconstruction and development efforts are as vital as
actions taken to re-establish and maintain peace and must
therefore be addressed with the same attention and urgency
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on the part of the international community (UN News
Centre).
The situation in Burundi is a great concern for human rights groups because the refugee
situation presents a “wide array of displacement issues.” (Cohen and Deng, 17) The
problem that the Great Lakes Region is dealing with is not limited to refugees, there is
also a large number of internally displaced persons. They are within the borders of their
home country, yet they have no home and no means to support themselves. The matter at
hand is also complicated by the fact that not all internally displaced persons are in dire
need. As Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng assert, “thousands of uprooted Burundians
no longer have access to land for farming, while thousands of other displaced Burundians
are still able to engage in agriculture. Thousands of displaced Burundians who need relief
assistance do not receive it regularly, while large numbers of uprooted Burundians who
probably need little or no relief have attracted significant amounts of it.” (17)
However, besides the internal conflict, one must be aware of other factors that
created the problem of internal displacement. According to Cohen and Deng, living with
violence for so many years Burundians have learned to run not only when danger is clear
and present but also when it is expected. (32) They further argue, that in the beginning
displacement was only a result of violence, but increasingly, displacement “has become a
deliberate goal of the violence” (32). One of the most pressing issues underlying the
crisis of internally displaced persons is that there is not even an estimate of the number of
people who are internally displaced. The government of Burundi, and even the United
Nations cannot resolve the problem of internally displaced persons when the numbers
and identities of the internally displaced persons are unknown. Further, there is no one to
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ask such responsibility of because if we are to lay the responsibility of keeping track of
displaced persons on the Burundian government, there arises an objection that Burundian
government could not have kept track of internally displaced persons because it was
dealing with an armed conflict and a genocide. The United Nations, theoretically, also
cannot be held responsible because the United Nations can only step in to keep the peace.
As was the excuse with Rwanda, “there was no peace to keep.” Cohen and Deng further
stress, that it was the violence of 1972 in Burundi that “profoundly changed Burundi.”
(34) A large number of the Hutu fled the country, and as a result, Tutsi occupied the
lands left behind by the Hutu and their businesses. This displacement “became
permanent, and the nation’s economy suffered.” (34)
In the crisis of internal displacement another crucial factor must be highlighted—
the matter of humanitarian aid. In 1994, Rwandan Hutu refugees came to Burundi to seek
asylum, unfortunately, their presence “exacerbated local tensions” because, as Cohen and
Deng explain, Burundian Tutsi believed that Rwandan Hutu were responsible for the
1994 massacre of Tutsi in Rwanda. (46) The tensions were intensified not by the
presence of Rwandan refugees in Burundi but because with their presence, the food aid
would have to be given to them as well, and at this point in time, there was already a
widespread belief that humanitarian aid was not distributed evenly. The Tutsi groups
were convinced that the Hutu population benefited more from the humanitarian aid.
In 2004, Human Rights First came out with a summary report of the conference
held in Kampala, Uganda regarding protection of refugees in the Great Lakes Region.
Part of the report offers possible “durable solutions” and emphasizes that repatriation is
advised only if refugees are returning to a stable and safe environment. The report also
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mentions that in Burundi many returning refugees found themselves in “a new round of
exile” due to lack of stability and lack of available land (13). To prevent “irregular or
secondary movement of refugees,” the report suggests approaching repatriation
operations “on the basis of national caseloads” (14). Furthermore, in the repatriation
operations, it is vital that a refugee leaves the host country voluntarily. In the case that a
refugee does not wish to return, the report urges the need to “develop accurate
registration procedures” (14). Finally, the Human Rights First summary report warns, that
“if procedures for the identification of continuing needs

for

protection [are] not

thoroughly addressed concerns about the motivation for reluctance to return could poison
local support for the establishment of long term refuge” (14).
While Human Rights First proposes a reliable system of repatriation, at the
present time for countries like Tanzania and for refugees themselves, it is not a practical
solution. Tanzania hosts over 400,000 refugees, and the largest population of refugees is
from Burundi. Tanzania has been completely overwhelmed by and not equipped for
dealing with such large flow of refugees into its borders. However, acknowledging that
danger is still present in Burundi and that Burundi still does not offer a stable
environment to those willing to come back, Tanzania cannot, and does not turn away
people seeking asylum nor close its borders.
In the realm of international law, the Burundian conflict and those involved have
sidestepped numerous legal boundaries and continue to do so. The Human Rights Watch
Report emphasizes:
International law prohibits state forces and rebel groups from
committing willful killing, torture and other ill-treatment of
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civilians and captured combatants, among other abuses. The
government of Burundi is also bound by international human
rights law, which prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention,
torture and other mistreatment, and prosecutions that do not
meet international fair trial standards (2)
In January of this year, the Security Council discussed the issue of conflict in the Great
Lakes region and the result was Resolution 1653 which calls on the governments of the
states suffering from internal conflict “to disarm and demobilize militias and armed
groups” (Resolution 1653). While Security Council resolutions are the only documents of
the United Nations that do have legal power, we know from past international incidents
that even the Security Council resolutions are often not obeyed by certain members of the
international community.
From an academic point of view, Peter Uvin addresses the argument of ethnicity
and power in Burundi and Rwanda; in his piece, Uvin suggests that colonization deeply
affected and changed the nature of the Burundian government. As a result, “Political,
social, and even economic relations became more rigid, unequal, and biased against the
Hutu, while the power of many people of Tutsi origin greatly increased” (255). Uvin’s
analysis of the Burundian history of conflict leads to the conclusion that, “violence
tended to occur at key points of political change, when the interests of the elites were
threatened, but it has also always involved massive popular participation” (263). Peter
Uvin addresses the most recent incidents of violence in Burundi and points out that they
are “the direct result of processes of democratization set in motion in large part by the
pressure from the international community” (267). Militant groups and others involved
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clearly have no interest in democracy. While the militant groups see democracy as
unnecessary for Burundi, because they want to continue their violent activity, others see
it as something evil because it comes from the very people who have continuously turned
away from Burundi. Seeing that the result of attempted democratization has been nothing
other than bloodshed, “the international community showed a total unwillingness to
defend the processes it had set in motion” (267). Uvin presents an argument familiar to
the international law and international relations students; the international community
expected to see immediate resolution of the conflict and quiet willingness for consensus.
However, because Burundi did not present a direct interest to the most powerful member
states, the violent reaction to the democratization was used as a justification that the
conflict in Burundi was hopeless. This ploy is unoriginal because, the international
community tends to lack response when there is a dire need to help an African country
that has been dealing with internal conflict for many years. Of course, it is easier to throw
up your hands helplessly and claim that nothing can be done with “these savages”, rather
than roll up your sleeves and get to action. Wars and genocides are not stopped overnight
and the international community has seen enough precedents to acknowledge the
complexity of the situation in Burundi. The conflict in Burundi is critical and can no
longer be denied and ignored; if the leaders of the international community do not put
their heads together and help Burundi fight for a peaceful future, this will affect the rest
of the world even more than it already has. Furthermore, as Sylvestre Barancira, a
Burundian psychologist said, “If nothing is done to put a stop to the crisis, Burundi will
know many social misfits and risks being transformed into a nation of savages and
madmen.” (Janzen and Janzen, 202)
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Leonce Ndikumana argues in his piece Towards a Solution to Violence in
Burundi: A Case for Political and Economic Liberalization, that “the conflict in Burundi
is the outcome of institutional failure that has perpetuated economic and political
inequality across ethnic groups and regions” and further states that “a solution to the
crisis must resolve around political and economic liberalization” (432). He further offers
that in order to progress in the process to stability, Burundi needs to establish institutional
mechanisms that would prevent future violence. (432) Furthermore, the new political
regime must be “owned by the citizens from all economic, ethnic, and regional
backgrounds” thus assuring a completely equal system where there is no one group that
has more power in any way, shape, or form. (432) Originally, the one party system in
Burundi was promoted as a way to unify the groups involved in the conflict, “but in fact
the party became an instrument of ethnic exclusion” (437). In closing his argument,
Ndikumana asserts that if the conflict in Burundi is identified in terms of political and
economic issues there are several viable solutions that would accelerate the progress to
stability: “eradicating the tradition of using the state for oppression and accumulation;
achieving egalitarian government; and protecting the rights of all citizens” (Abstract).
While this proposition appears possible, in reality it is not viable due to its ambiguity.
Ndikumana fails to explain who exactly would be responsible for beginning this process
and, essentially, enforcing it. The Tutsis are using their power within the security forces
to control the citizens and prevent them from protesting against the injustice and the
abuses by the government. Therefore, there is no one left to “protect the rights of all
citizens” unless it is someone who is neutral to the conflict. However, here is the
obstacle; the organization that is supposed to be neutral, and was established precisely for
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a situation like the one in Burundi is watching silently while the death toll rises and the
refugee and internally displaced population increases to astronomical numbers.
Tony Waters reviewed several books and publications that address the Tutsi-Hutu
conflict in Burundi, as well as the neighboring countries. Waters presents Renè
Lemarchand’s idea that the Tutsi-Hutu conflict is a “social construct” (344). Waters
further argues that if the Tutsi-Hutu conflict is a “fixed social identity,” the fact that
similar “ethnic divisions exist in neighboring countries, particularly Tanzania” is ignored.
(344) Waters points out that “most analyses of the presumed differences between Hutu
and Tutsi start with the nation-state and not the ethnic categories in sub-titles” (345). He
further claims that “if the assumption of the nation-state is taken away, the divide
between Hutu and Tutsi can at the same time be presented as trivial, as the basis for
nationalistic ideologies, as a pastoral lifestyle” (345). Essentially, Tony Waters concludes
that the Hutu and Tutsi do not “inherently” hate each other, in fact, he points out that the
only cases of “ethnocide” of Hutu and Tutsi occurred in Burundi and Rwanda, not
anywhere else. Because Rwanda and Burundi are the only examples, analysis of the
relationship between Hutu and Tutsi is alone not sufficient to get to the core of the issue.
Therefore, claims Waters, it is the “political nature of the nation-state” that needs to be
analyzed. He suggests that in analyzing the Burundian conflict, if ethnicity is completely
ruled out as the cause for the conflict, it will be easier to get to the root of the problem.
“The current strategy of placing Hutu and Tutsi in separate refugee camps is likely to
perpetuate the separatist ethnic ideologies of their respective activists in the long run,”
emphasizes Waters. Judging from Waters’s analysis, he sees the government and the
colonial system as the “instigators” of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi.
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While Waters presents a compelling argument, saying that focus must be directed
at the nation-state and not the ethnic conflict, his argument is ambiguous. When looking
at the history of Burundi as a nation-state what historical options are available? Burundi
before colonization—a strong and thriving kingdom; Burundi of 1962, that just received
its independence from Belgium and is working on building a government, and Burundi
after 1965, as we know it now, submerged in perpetual conflict. After Burundi received
its independence, the prime minister was assassinated, and it has been in conflict ever
since. Therefore, analysis of the nation-state is not sufficient. Furthermore, Waters’
analysis above clearly shows that ethnicity is not the root of the conflict either.
It is no longer effective or practical to look back in time to find the “perpetrator”
or the root cause of the conflict in Burundi. As Kofi Annan said, we must look to the
future for solution because we are leaving this planet to our children. As sad as it may be,
events of the past, are just that, the past. We cannot change the past and we cannot erase
it. We must look to the past to learn from our mistakes and to correct ourselves to better
our situation in the present. However, the solutions lie in the future, not in the past
because it is blatantly clear that the way the international community has acted towards
internal crises in the past, was to say the least, ineffective. An effective solution, above
all must involve member states who have absolutely no way to benefit by helping
Burundi. Their involvement must be for the sole reason of their passionate wish to see
Burundi as a stable country in every sense of that word. The only way, the Burundi
conflict will be resolved is if the states “helping” are not there to promote democracy, and
are not there to promote any other kind of their interests. The solution will come from the
states that have nothing to gain from being involved.
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